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CASENOTES
State Court Jurisdiction Over Trespassory Union Picketing: Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. San Diego County District Council of Carpenters '—Sears, Roebuck & Co. op-
erated a large department store in Chula Vista, California. On October 23,
1973, representatives of the San Diego District Council of Carpenters (Union)
discovered that men who had not been dispatched from the union hiring hall
were performing carpentry work at the store. 2 Union representatives met
with Sears' management and requested that Sears either contract the carpen-
try work through a building trades contractor who employed carpenters dis-
patched front the hiring hall, or agree to abide by the terms of the union's
master labor agreement relative to the dispatch and wages of carpenters.
Sears never accepted or rejected these demands.'
Two days later, the union set up picket lines on Scars' property. The
pickets were located on the private walkways immediately adjacent. to the store
and in the store's parking areas.' The pickets carried signs identifying them-
selves as members of the Carpenters Trade Union. They were peaceful and
orderly.' The Sears security manager requested that the pickets leave Sears'
property. The pickets refused, stating that they would not leave unless legally
compelled.
On October 29, 1973, Sears filed a complaint in California Superior
Court seeking an injunction against the continuing trespass." The court
granted a temporary restraining order enjoining the union front picketing on
Sears' property.' In response, the union moved its pickets to the public
sidewalk approximately 200 feet. from their original position." After a full
hearing, the California Superior Court entered a preliminary injunction
against further picketing on Sears' property."
The union unsuccessfully appealed the issuance of the preliminary in-
junction to the California Court of Appeal. 1 ' The appellate court agreed
' 431i U.S. 1811 (1978).
Id. at. 182.
Id.
Id. The Sears store was located in the center of a large rectangular lot.
Walkways and parking lots surrounded the building. Id.
Id.
" Id. at 183.
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, No.
347511 (Super. Ct.., San Diego County 1973). The injunction was issued in an ex parte
proceeding. Sec 436 U.S. at 212 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
8
 4136 U.S. at 183. The union apparently found the picketing to be ineffective
at this location and stopped picketing on November 12, 1973. id.
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters. NO.
347511 (Super. Cr_ San Diego County 1973). The injunction restrained the union. its
officers, agents. representatives. and members from "causing, instigating, furthering,
participating in, or carrying on picketing on the plaintiff's property ....- The injunc-
tion specifically noted that this order and preliminary injunction shall not apply no the
public sidewalks on 5th Avenue, 'IT Street and '1' Street which arc adjacent to the
private property of the plaintiff. - Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist.
Council of Carpenters, 17 Cal. 3d 893, 896, 132 Cal. Rini% 443, 446 (1976).
1 " Sears. Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49
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with the superior court that state law did not prohibit the injunction and that
the first and fourteenth amendments did not protect the picketing." It also
concluded that federal labor law did not preempt state court jurisdiction over
the picketing at Sears.' 2 The appellate court found that the trespassory pick-
eting at Sears fell within an established exception to the general rule that
state courts lack jurisdiction over disputes covered by federal labor law."
Under this exception, state courts may exercise jurisdiction over conduct "so
deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of com-
pelling congressional direction, we could not infer that Congress had deprived
the States of the power to act. , 14
The California Supreme Court reversed the appellate court." It found
that, the union's conduct was both arguably protected by section 7 1 " and argu-
ably prohibited by section 8" of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or
Act.).' 8 Since the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) has ex-
clusive subject matter jurisdiction over conduct which is arguably protected or
arguably prohibited by the NLRA, the California Supreme Court. held that
the lower court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the trespassory picket-
ing.'" The court. therefore vacated the injunction. 2 "
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari,'' reversed the
California Supreme Court, and H ELD: the jurisdiction of the NLRB does not
preempt state court jurisdiction over an employer's action to enforce state
trespass laws against nonemployee union pickets where: (1) the picketing is
either arguably protected or arguably prohibited by the NLRA, (2) the pickets
Cal. App. 3d 232, 122 Cal. Rptr. 449, aff'd on rehearing, 52 Cal. App. 3d 4190, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 245 (1975).
'' Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 52
Cal. App. 3d 690, 704-05, 125 Cal. Rpt.r. 245, 254-55 (1975).
12 See id. at 4'97, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 249.
1 ' See text and notes 36-39 infra. See generally Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revis-
ited, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1337 (1972); Come, Federal Preemption of Labor-Management Rela-
tions: Current Problems in the Application of Garmon, 56 VA. L. REV. 1435 (1970); Les-
nick, Preemption Reconsidered: The Apparent Reaffirmation (rf Garmon, 72 CoLum. L. REV.
469 (1972).
14
 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 52
Cal. App. 3d at 696-97, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 249 (quoting San Diego Bldg. Trades Coun-
cil v. Gannon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959)).
1 ' Scars, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 17
Cal. 3d 893, 907, 553 1).2d 603, 614, 132 Cal. Rpt.r. 443, 454 (1976).
1 " Section 7 provides in pertinent part:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ....
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
' 7 Section 8 categorizes both employer and union unfair labor practices. 29
U.S.C. §§ 158(a)-(g) (1976).
' 8 Scars, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 17
Cal. 3d 893, 901, 553 1).2d 603, 610, 132 Cal. Rptr. 443, 450 (1976).
'" Id. at 906-07, 553 P.2d at 613-14, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 453-54.
Ard.
'n
 430 U.S. 905 (1977).
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have been requested to leave the employer's property but they have not filed
a section 8(a)(I) charge with the Board, and (3) the employer cannot effec-
tively bring the dispute before the NLRB . 22
 Three justices dissented, arguing
that the Court should retain the primary jurisdiction approach. 23
 The dissent
asserted that the primary jurisdiction approach avoided the problem of state
court interference with national labor policy and could he applied easily by
state courts." The dissent also predicted that allowing state courts to enjoin
peaceful trespassory picketing would lead to inconsistent state and federal
remedies:25 and create the possibility of state courts' restraining protected ac-
tivity. 2 "
The Court's resolution of the trespassory picketing issue in Sears, granting
state courts subject matter jurisdiction over such picketing, is a significant de-
velopment' in two respects. 27 First, Sears gives state courts jurisdiction to en-
join a form of concerted activity which is arguably protected by federal labor
law. Second, the Court announced in Sears a new balancing approach to
preemption under which it will weigh both the employer's and the state's in-
terest in state court jurisdiction against the potential interference with national
labor policy in order to determine whether a state court may assert jurisdic-
tion over some aspect of a labor dispute. This balancing test is a clear depar-
ture from the Court's traditional primary jurisdiction approach.
This casenote will first outline the primary jurisdiction approach to fed-
eral preemption prior to Sears. The rationale of the majority and the dissent
in Sears will then be analyzed in detail. Finally, this casenote will discuss the
significance and probable impact of the Sears decision in the field of labor law
preemption. In particular, it will discuss the procedural uncertainties which
the partial concurrent jurisdiction of the NLRB and state courts creates.
22 436 U.S. at 201-02. justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court in
which Chief justice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist
joined. justices Blackmun and Powell also filed separate concurring opinions, differing
with each other as to the procedural impact of the decision.
23 Id. at 214. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall, dis-
sented.
24
 Id. at 216-Justice Brennan reasoned that "Nhe limitation on employer rem-
edies is fully justified both by the ease of application of the test by thousands of state
and federal judges and by its effects of averting the danger that slate courts may
interfere with national labor policy." Id.
25 Id. at 219.
2" Id. at 221.
" In two cases prior to Sears, the issue whether peaceful trespassory union
picketing was preempted from state court jurisdiction was left open by the Court.
Taggart v. Weinacker's, Inc., 283 Ala. 171, 214 So. 2d 913 (1968), cert. granted, 396
U.S. 813 (1969), cert. dismissed, 397 U.S. 223 (1970); Meat Cutters Local 427 v. Fairlawn
Meat, 353 U.S. 20, 24-25 (1957). State courts which had considered the problem were
divided over whether they had jurisdiction over peaceful trespassory picketing. (:om-
pare Shirley v. Retail Store Employees Union, 222 Kan. 373, 565 P.2d 585 (1977) and
Freeman v. Retail Clerks Local 12f)7, 58 Wash. 2d 527, 363 P.2d 803 (1961) (en bane)
(cases where federal preemption was found) with May Dep . t. Stores Co. v. Teamsters
Local 743, 64 III. 2d 153, 355 N.E.2c1 7 (1976) and People v. Bush, 39 N.Y.2d 529, 349
N.E.2d 832, 384 N.V.S.2d 733 (1976) and Hood v. Stafford, 213 Tenn. 684, 378
S.W.2d 766 (1964) (cases where state court jurisdiction was found).
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I. THE PRIMARY JURISDICTION APPROACH
A. Formation of the Primary Jurisdiction Approach
The proper accommodation of federal labor legislation and state law has
been a difficult and contentious issue since the passage of the Wagner Act in
1935. 28 Although the NLRA deals specifically with some aspects of state
jurisdiction in labor disputes," to a large degree "the statutory implications
concerning what has been taken from the states and what has been left to
them are of a Delphic nature, to be translated into concreteness by the pro-
cess of litigating elucidation."'" In 1959, after a lengthy period of "litigating
elucidation," the Supreme Court, in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Car-
mon,"' hekl that the NLRB has primary and exclusive subject matter jurisdic-
tion over labor disputes arguably covered by the NLRA to the exclusion of
state and federal courts."'
In Garman, members of the San Diego Building Trades Council de-
manded that a construction company execute a collective bargaining agree-
ment. that included a union shop provision."' The company refused. The
unions began to picket peacefully and discouraged sonic customers from
doing business with the company," In an action instituted by the employer,
the California Superior Court found that the unions' picketing was for the
illegal purpose of coercing the employer to sign a collective bargaining
agreement regardless of the employees' wishes. The court therefore enjoined
the picketing and awarded damages. 35
The United States Supreme Court reversed the California court and held
that the National Labor Relations Board had primary and exclusive jurisdic-
tion over the dispute, and, therefore, that the California Superior Court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue the injunction.' Justice Frank-
28 Wagner Act, ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935). See Cox, supra note 13, at
1337.
2 " See, e.g., §. 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976) (by agreement with a state agency
the Board may cede jurisdiction to such agency); § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976)
(state mediatory or conciliatory agencies must be notified before a party may terminate
or modify an existing collective bargaining agreement); § 14(b), 29 U.S.C. § 164(b)
(1976) (the Act may riot be construed as authorizing agreements requiring union
membership as a condition of employment where such agreements are prohibited by
state laws); § 14(c)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 164(0(2) (1976) (the Act does not bar states from
asserting jurisdiction over labor disputes over which the Board declines to assert juris-
diction because of insufficient effect on interstate commerce).
3 ' r International Ass'u of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 619 (1958)
(Frankfurter, J.).
:" 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
" 2
 Id. at 245.
"" 359 U.S. at 237.
34 id .
'' Id. at 237-38.
3 i' The Supreme Court first dissolved the injunction and remanded the case to
the California Supreme Court for reconsideration of the damage award. San Diego
Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26, 29 (1957). The California Supreme
Court affirmed the damage award. Gannon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, 49
Cal. 2d 595, 615, 320 P.2(1 473, 485 (1958). On rehearing, the Supreme Court re-
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furter, writing for the Court, fashioned the scope of the primary jurisdiction
of the NLRB:
When it is clear or may fairly he assumed that the activities which a
State purports to regulate are protected by § 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act, or constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8, due
regard for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must
yield. ... At times it has not been clear whether the particular activ-
ity regulated by the States was governed by § 7 or § 8 or was,
perhaps, outside both these sections. But courts are not primary tri-
bunals to adjudicate such issues. It is essential to the administration
of the Act that these determinations be left in the first instance to
the National Labor Relations Board.... When an activity is arguably
subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the Stales as well as the federal
courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor
Relations Board if the danger of state interference with the national
policy is to be averted. 37
Despite the seeming rigidity of the primary jurisdiction approach as
enunciated by Justice Frankfurter, it did not exclude all state regulation of
labor disputes. The Garmon Court created two exceptions to the NLRB's
preemption of state court jurisdiction. One exception was that state courts
retained jurisdiction over conduct that was of "merely peripheral concern of
the Labor Management Relations Act."" Under the other Gannon exception,
versed the damage award. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Gannon, 359 U.S. 236,
248 (1959).
359 U.S. at 244-45 (citations omitted). See also Cox, supra note 13, at 1348-
51. Two policy considerations underlie the Gannon primary jurisdiction approach to
federal preemption in labor disputes. First, the Court sought to minimize the risk that
state courts, through differences in substantive law, procedure, or remedies, would
conflict with the NLRB and national labor policy. Second, the Court felt that the stand-
ard for federal preemption should be easily applied by the lower state courts. Id. at
242-43. See Motor Coach Employees v. Lockriclge, 403 U.S. 274, 290 (1971). Justice
Harlan, writing the Court's opinion in Lockridge, cited the impracticality of case-by-case
adjudication of federal preemption in the Supreme Court as the reason for a clear
rule of preemption. As he stated:
Nor can we proceed on a case-by-case basis to determine whether each
particular final judicial pronouncement does, or might reasonably be
thought to, conflict in sonic relevant manner with federal labor policy. This
Court is ill-equipped to play such a role and the federal system dictates
that this problem be solved with a rule capable of relatively easy applica-
tion, so that lower courts may largely police themselves in this regard.
Id. at. 289-90.
" 359 U.S. at 243. See Hooten, The Exceptional Garmon Doctrine, 26 LAB. L.J.
49, 52 (1975). Cases which have fallen within this exception include international Ass'n
of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 62{) (1958) (pre-Garmon case, state court has
jurisdiction over suit brought by union member against his union for wrongful expul-
sion from the union); Hanna Mining Co. v. Marine Eng'rs, 382 U.S. 181, 193 (1965)
(state court has jurisdiction to apply state labor relations law to union of supervisory
personnel); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 180 (1967) (state court has jurisdiction over
union member's suit for breach of the duty of fair representation by his union). Vaca
added a new exception to the primary jurisdiction approach. State courts may retain
jurisdiction where the particular rule of law involved is so structured and administered
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the NLRB did not preempt state court jurisdiction over conduct that "touched
interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the ab-
sence of compelling congressional direction, it could not infer that Congress
had deprived the States of the power to act." 39
B. Erosion of the Primary Jurisdiction Approach
The primary jurisdiction approach enunciated in Garrison stood for nearly
twenty years. The Supreme Court repeatedly reaffirmed this basic ap-
proach." With the Supreme Court's decision in Linn v. Plant Guard Workers
Local 114, 4 ' however, an erosion of the primary jurisdiction approach began.
In Linn, the assistant manager of the Pinkerton Detective Agency brought
a diversity action in federal court against the union, alleging that statements
contained in a pamphlet used in the union's organizational campaign defamed
him.42 The district court dismissed the complaint because of the primary juris-
diction of the NLRB.'" The Supreme Court, however, held that. a federal
court in a diversity action in which state law applies could entertain a libel
action arising out of a labor dispute. 44 The Court determined that a suit
alleging malicious libel falls within both of the exceptions to the primary
jurisdiction approach . 45 First, the Court found that malicious libel is a
"merely peripheral concern of the Labor Management Relations Act;"" thus,
there is no significant conflict between a court's consideration of a libel suit.
and enforcement of national labor policy. Second, the Court held that "a
State's concern with redressing malicious libel is 'so deeply rooted in local
feeling and responsibility' that it fits within the exception specifically carved
out by Garmon." 47
that in virtually all instances it is safe to presume that judicial supervision will not
disserve the interest promoted by the federal labor statutes. See 386 U.S. at 180-81.
39 Cannon, 359 U.S. at 244. Cases which have fallen under this exception in-
clude Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 640 (1958); Youngdahl v. Rainfair
Inc., 355 U.S. 131, 139 (1957); United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp.,
347 U.S. 656, 664-65 (1959) (three cases where mass picketing, violence, and threats of
violence were found to be within state court jurisdiction); Linn v. Plant. Guard Workers
Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 61 (1966) (state court has jurisdiction to award damages for
actual injury caused by libel, published with actual malice, during the course of a rep-
resentation election), See also Hooters, supra note 38, at 51-52.
" See Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 285 (1971); Lodge
76 International Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427
U.S. 132, 138 (1976).
." 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
42 Id. at 56.
43 Id. at 55.
" Id. at 61-62. The court limited the availability of state remedies by requiring
that a plaintiff prove that the statement was published with knowledge of falsity, or
reckless disregard of the truth or falsity, and that the plaintiff suffered actual harm.
Id. at 65.
45
 Id. at 61-62.
" Id. at 61.
47
 Id. at 62.
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Although the Court in Lion appeared to follow Cartoon, there are indica-
tions in the Court's opinion of an erosion of the primary jurisdiction ap-
proach. The Linn Court made two findings which were not necessary to the
application of the primary jurisdiction approach. The Court first determined
that malicious libel clearly was not protected by section 7 of the NLRA."
The Court also found that the issues before the Board on a possible unfair
labor practice charge and those before a court on a defamation complaint
would be different." The Court did not pull these findings into an explicit.
standard. The findings suggest, however, that the Court not only utilized the
traditional primary jurisdiction approach in reaching its decision, but also bal-
anced the state's interest in protecting its residents from libels against the risk
that state court exercise of jurisdiction would interfere with the Board's
administration of the NLRA. The Court concluded that, on balance, the
state's interest was greater than the risk of interference with national labor
policy.'"
Although the Court. in Linn merely hinted at a new balancing approach to
federal preemption, it later explicitly articulated this approach in Farmer a.
United Brotherhood rf Carpenters. 5 ' In Farmer, a carpenter sued his union in
state court for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 52
 The Court an-
nounced that in deciding whether the state court had jurisdiction to entertain
the suit., it would approach preemption by "examining the state interests in
regulating the conduct in question and the potential for interference with the
federal regulatory scheme." 53
 The Court. held that in cases involving allega-
tions of intentional infliction of emotional distress the "potential for inter-
ference is insufficient. to counter-balance the legitimate and substantial interest.
of the State in protecting its citizens." 54
 The Court therefore allowed the
state court. to exercise jurisdiction.
Through the development of a balancing approach, Linn and Former
eroded the clear rule of the Garmon primary jurisdiction approach. This
balancing approach to federal preemption, applied concurrently with the
Garmon primary jurisdiction approach, formed the analytical structure for the
Court's opinion in Sears.
48 Id. at 61.
49 Id. at 63. If either the employer or the union filed a charge with the Board
concerning false or misleading statements in campaign literature, the Board would
only intervene in the election where there has been a misrepresentation, or other simi-
lar campaign trickery, which involves a substantial departure from the truth at a time
which prevents the other party or parties from making an effective reply so that the
misrepresentation whether deliberate or not may reasonably he expected to have a
significant impact on the election. See General Knit of Calif., 239 No. 101, 99
L.R.R.N1. 1687 (1978).
5 " 383 U.S. at 64.
" 430 U.S. 290 (1977).
" Id. at 293.
53 Id. at 297.
54 Id. at 304.
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El, THE SEARS DECISION
Guided by the primary jurisdiction approach, the Court. in Sears 55 first
considered whether the arguably prohibited nature of the union's conduct
preempted state court jurisclictio ► . 5" The Court then considered whether the
arguably protected character of the union's conduct ousted state court jurisdic-
tion. 57 The Court determined that neither the arguably prohibited nor the
arguably protected nature of the union's conduct precluded state jurisdiction.
Turning to the first inquiry of the primary jurisdiction approach,
whether the conduct at issue was arguably prohibited, the Court in Sears de-
termined that there were two theories under which the trespassory picketing
was arguably prohibited by section 8 of the NI.R.A. 48 If the union's purpose
in picketing was to coerce Scars into assigning the carpentry work to union
carpenters dispatched from the hiring hall, the picketing arguably violated
section 8(b)(4)(D). 5" Alternatively, if the union's purpose was to force the
company to recognize the union, then the picketing arguably was subject to
the restrictions of section 8(b)(7)(C)."" Under the primary jurisdiction ap-
proach set forth in Garman, the Court's finding that the conduct was arguably
prohibited would trigger NLRB preemption of state court jurisdiction over
Sears' trespass claim." ► The Court,. however, refused to apply the Cannon
primary jurisdiction approach in a mechanical fashio ► ."' Rather, the Court
developed a new approach to determine whether to preempt state court juris-
55 436 U.S. at 182. Justice Stevens, the author of the majority opinion, was
joined by Chief justice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist.
'" Id. at 1911. 
1(1. at 199.
58 Id. at 185.
" 9 Id. at 186 & n.9. Section 8(14(4)(1)) provides in pertinent part:
It shall he an unfair labor practice for a lahor organization or its agents ...
(4) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in
an industry affecting commerce. where ... an object thereof is, ... (1))
forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to employees
in a particular labor organization or in a particular trade, craft, or class
rather than to employees in another labor organization or in another trade,
craft, or class, unless such employer is Palling to conform to an order or
certification of the Board determining the bargaining representative for
employees performing such work.
9 9 U.S.C.: 	 58(b)(4)(1)) (1976).
"" 436 U.S. at 186 & n.10. Section 8(b)(7)(C) states in pertinent. part.:
It shall be an unfair labor practice For it labor organization or its agents ...
(7) to picket.... any employer where an object thereof is forcing or requir-
ing an employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the
representative of his employees ... unless such labor organization is cur-
rently certified as the representative of such employees: . „ (C) Where
such picketing has been conducted without a petition ... [for a repre-
sentative election] being filed within a reasonable time not to exceed thirty
days from the commencement of such picketing.
99 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(C) (1976).
" See text at note 37 supra.
436 U.S. at 188.
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diction. Under its new test, the Court weighs the state's interest in protecting
its citizens from the challenged conduct against the risk that a state court
proceeding would interfere with the regulatory jurisdiction of the NLRB." 3
As to the risk of interference with the NLRB, the Court found that this
risk was slight since the controversies presented to the respective forums
would be different."' If Scars had filed a section 8(b)(4)(1))" 5 or section
8(b)(7)(C) 66
 charge with the NLRB, the Court reasoned, the issue before the
Board would have been the union's purpose in establishing the picket
line." The issue before the California Superior Court in the trespass action,
however, was not the purpose but the location of the pickets."' Due to the
difference between the issues presented to the state and federal forums, the
Court concluded that "permitting the state court to adjudicate Sears' trespass
claim would create no realistic risk of interference with the Board's primary
jurisdiction to enforce the statutory prohibition against unfair labor prac-
tices.'" Turning to the other side of the balance, the Court concluded that
the state's interest in protecting private property rights outweighed the slight
risk of interference with the Board's regulatory jurisdiction.'" Therefore,
under the Court's new balancing approach, federal labor law did not
preeempt the California court's jurisdiction over Sears' trespass action. The
arguably prohibited nature of the union's conduct alone was "insufficient to
preclude a State from exercising jurisdiction limited to the trespassory as-
pects" of the union's picketing. 7 '
Perhaps a more difficult question facing the Court in Sears was whether
the arguably protected nature of the union's conduct precluded the California
court from entertaining Sears' trespass action. The Court recognized the
union's position that its purpose in picketing was to persuade Sears to comply
with area standards for wages and benefits, and, therefore, the picketing was
arguably protected by section 7 of the NLRA. 72
 Application of the primary
jurisdiction approach would place jurisdiction of the dispute with the
NLRB." The Court, however, announced that "the mere fact that the
"' Id. at 196-97.
" 4 hi. at 197.
"' 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(1)) (1976). See note 59 supra for text of this provision.
"" 29 U.S.C. § l58(h)(7)(C) (1976). See note 60 supra for text of this provision.
"7
 Id. at 198 & n.28.
"8 Id. at 198. The injunction only restrained the union from picketing on
Sears' property; the union was free to picket on the public sidewalks. The objective of
the union in picketing was immaterial to the state court. See note 9 supra.
"" 436 U.S. at 198.
7" Id.
71 Id.
72
 Brief for Respondent. at 23, Scars. Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Disc
Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978). Picketing to persuade an employer to
comply with area standards and to inform the public that a particular employer is not
paying area standards is protected conduct. See Hod Carriers Local 41, 133 N.L.R.B.
512, 512, 48 L.R.R.M. 1667, 1667 (1961); Longshoremen's Local 1416 v. Ariadne Ship-
ping Co., 397 U.S. 195, 201 (1970).
73
 See text at note 37 supra.
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union's trespass was arguably protected is insufficient. to deprive the state court
of jurisdiction in this case." 74
In place of the arguably protected arm of the primary jurisdiction ap-
proach, the Court developed another balancing test to determine whether the
state has jurisdiction over the disputed conduct. Under this new approach, the
Court balances the anomaly of denying an employer a forum against the risk
that the state court will misinterpret federal law and restrain activity protected
by federal labor law." 5 In relating its new balancing test to the case at hand,
the Court noted that an employer is denied a forum where he does not have
a reasonable opportunity either to invoke the Board's jurisdiction or to induce
the other party to do so.'" Although Sears could have filed a charge based
on either section 8(b)(4)(D) 77 or section 8(b)(7)(C) 78 of the N LRA, these
charges would have presented the issue of the union's purpose rather than
the location of the picketing.'" There was no procedural route whereby
Sears could have presented simply the issue of trespass to the NLRB.'" Thus,
Sears was denied a forum for redress of the union's trespass.
The Court then examined the other side of the balance, the risk that the
state court would misinterpret federal law and restrain protected conduct.
The Court found slight weight on this side of the balance for two reasons.
First, federal courts rarely protect. trespassory activity, so there is only a small
chalice that a state court would restrict federally protected activity." The
standard for protection of trespassory picketing was developed by the Su-
preme Court in NLRB v. Babock & Wilcox Co." In Babcock & Wilcox, the
74 436 U.S. at 200.
75 Id. at 906.
76 hl. at 201. The Court specifically addled the converse as well; "The primary
jurisdiction rationale unquestionably requires that when the same controversy may he
presented to ihe state court or the NLRB, it must be presented to the Board." Id. at
209 .
77 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(D) (1976). See note 59 supra.
" 29 U.S.C. § I58(b)(7)(C) (1976). See note 60 supra.
7" See text and note 76 supra. "Fhe gravamen of the employer's unfair labor
practice charge would be that the purpose of the picketing was to force work reas-
signments or to organize the employees. The Board could find that the picketing was
not for these objectives, find no § 8(b)(4)(D) ar § 8(b)(7)(C) violation, and still not
make a determination whether the picketing was protected by § 7. 436 U.S. at 198
n.28, 201 n.31.
8" Id. at 201, 207 n.43. The union could have brought the issue of the location
of the picketing before the Board by filing a § 8(a)(1) charge after Sears' security
manager requested that the union pickets leave Sears' property. If the Board deter-
mined that the trespassory picketing was protected by § 7, the request to leave would
have constituted all unfair labor practice under § 8(a)(1). See Broomfield, Preemptive
Federal Jurisdiction Over Concerted Trespasswy Union Activity, 83 HARV. L. REV. 552, 568
(1970); Come, Federal Preemption of Labor-Management Relations: Current Problems in the
Application of Gannon, 56 VA. L. Rev. 1435, 1437 (1970).
81 436 U.S. at 205 n.41.
82 351 U.S. 105 (1956). In Babcock & Wilcox, the company prevented
nonemployee union organizers from distributing union literature on company prop-
erly. Id. at 106. The Supreme Court upheld the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' refusal
to allow trespassory organizational efforts. Id. at 144.
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Court held that an employer may enforce a rule prohibiting nonemployee
solicitation on company property, unless the employer discriminatorily applies
the rule to union organizers or the union has no effective, alternative means
of communicating with the employees." Since unions rarely meet the Babcock
& Wilcox standard,'" the Court in Sears determined that state courts probably
will not misapply the standard and restrain federally protected conduct."
Second, the Court found that the risk of state court misinterpretation is re-
duced further by the unions' having the choice of forum." If a union con-
siders its conduct protected, it can file a section 8(a)(1) 87 charge with the
Board after the employer asks the union pickets to leave." The Board then
can resolve the issue of the protected nature of the trespassory picketing."
Based on these two considerations, the Sears Court found that allowing state
courts to entertain trespass actions does not substantially increase the risk of
misinterpretation of federal law. The anomaly of denying employers a forum
to protect their property rights outweighs the small risk that state courts will
restrain protected activity. The Court, therefore, was "unwilling to presume
that Congress intended the arguably protected character of the Union's con-
duct to deprive the California courts of jurisdiction to entertain Sears' trespass
action."""
In summary, the Court in Sears acknowledged that, under the primary
jurisdiction approach, a finding that the disputed activity was either arguably
protected by section 7 or arguably prohibited by section 8 triggered preemp-
tion of state court jurisdiction by the NLRB."' However, although the Court
assumed that the trespassory picketing was both arguably protected and argu-
ably prohibited by the NLRA, 92
 it did not preempt state court jurisdiction."
Instead, the Court rejected the primary jurisdiction approach. To replace the
arguably protected prong of the primary jurisdiction approach, the Court de-
" Id. at 112. The Court in Babcock & Wilcox stated that "[w]hen the inaccessibil-
ity of employees makes ineffective the reasonable attempts by non-employees to com-
municate with them through the usual channels, the right to exclude from property
has been required to yield to the extent needed io permit communication of informa-
tion on the right to organize." Id. See also Scott Hudgens, 230 N.L.R.B. 414, 418, 95
L.R.R.Nt. 1351, 1355 (1977) (trespass by nonemployee union organizers protected ac-
tivity under Babcock & Wilcox).
84
 436 U.S. at 205.
85 Id.
84
 Id. at 206.
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976). Section 8(a)(1) provides in relevant part: "It
shall be an unthir labor practice for an employer—(1) to interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in [section 7]."
88 Id. The NLRB in an anticus curiae brief indicated that an employer's re-
quest to leave would be a 8(a)(1) violation, where the picketing was protected. 436
U.S. at 208-09 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
" Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, disagreed with this conclusion. Id.
at 212. See text and notes 139-40 infra.
436 U.S. at 207.
"L See text at note 37 supra.
"2
 436 U.S. at 187.
"a
 Id. at 198, 207.
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veloped a balancing test which weighs the anomaly of denying an employer a
forum against the risk that a state court will misinterpret federal labor law."
The Court. replaced the arguably prohibited prong of the primary jurisdiction
approach with another balancing test, this time weighing the state's interest in
regulating the conduct at issue against the risk of interference with the reg-
ulatory jurisdiction of the Labor Board." In Sears, the Court performed
both balancing tests and found that the anomaly of denying Sears a forum for
its trespass complaint outweighed the risk of state court misinterpretation of
federal labor law,• and the slate's interest. in regulating t.respassory picketing
outweighed the risk of interference with the jurisdiction of the NLRB."' The
Court therefore held that the California Superior Court had jurisdiction to
enjoin the union's picketing.''"
III. THE SEARS DISSENT
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart and. Marshall," dissented in
Sears, arguing that the Court should retain the primary jurisdiction approach
and deny the California Superior Court jurisdiction over Sears' request for
injunctive relief.'" The dissent contended that the primary jurisdiction ap-
proach is "an entirely acceptable, and probably the hest possible accommoda-
tion of the competing state-federal interests."'"
The dissent warned of several dangers in deviating from the primary
jurisdiction approach. Allowing state courts to entertain suits involving argu-
ably prohibited activity creates the risk that, state courts will misapply federal
law and restrain conduct that. Congress intended to he free from any gov-
ernmental restraint.'" Even where a state court correctly determines that a
particular activity is prohibited by federal labor law, the court's adjudication
of matters relating to that. activity may disrupt the congressional scheme if the
court imposes forms of relief that the NLRB would not impose."' Further-
more, state court jurisdiction over arguably protected activity creates the risk
of' a more direct interference with national labor policy. The dissent, reasoned
that state courts, due to their bias against organized labor, their lack of exper-
tise in labor issues, and their insensitive procedures, probably will restrain
"4
 hi. at 206.
"5
 hi. at 196.
9" Id. at 21)6.
" 7 Id. at 198.
"8
 hi. at 207-08.
"" a at 214 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
'"" hi. at 215.
""' hi. at 216.
1 " 2 hi. at 219. In International Association of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 14)) (1976), a case involving organizational
activites by it supervisors union, the Court indicated that some activities are outside
both the protections and prohibitions of the national labor laws and should properly
be left. unregulated by both federal and state authorities.
1 " 436 U.S. at 219.
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conduct that is protected by section 7, and thereby destroy rights which the
NLRA was created to protect.'" Filially, the dissent. characterized the majori-
ty's balancing approach as unworkable because it requires state courts to
evaluate three incalculable factors: the probability that they can properly de-
termine the underlying labor law issue, the strength of the argument that
section 7 protects the activity in question, and the strength of the state's in-
terest in affording the employer a state remedy.'" The dissent also found
no positive social harm in an employer's lack of a forum for a trespass claim
under the old primary jurisdiction approach.'" Rather, for the dissenters
the denial of a forum was justified by the ease of application of the primary
jurisdiction approach and its "effect of averting the danger that state courts
may interfere with national labor policy."'"
The dissenters in Sears were concerned that the majority had created "an
exception of indeterminate dimension to a principle of labor law preemption
that courts have followed for at least two decades."'" Moreover, in the dis-
senters' view, the majority's new balancing approach "promises to be applied
by the lower courts so as to disserve the interests protected by the national
labor laws."'"
1V. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NEW APPROACH TO PREEMPTION
The Sears decision is a significant development in labor law since it grants
state courts subject matter jurisdiction over trespassory picketing that is argu-
ably protected by section 7 of the NLRA. Sears is the first case since the Court
established the primary jurisdiction approach in Garmon where state courts
have been granted subject matter jurisdiction over conduct that is arguably
protected by section 7 of the NLRA.'" Previous cases in which the Court
recognized exceptions to the primary jurisdiction approach involved conduct
which was either prohibited''' or unprotected 112 by the NLRA.'"
Prior to Sears, in Hudgens v. NI_RB," 4 the Court gave the Board primary
responsibility for determining whether trespassory concerted activity is pro-
1114 Id. at 224.
1 " 5 Id. at 216.
ow 1(1.
11,7 hi,
1 ( 18 Id. at 215.
"09 Id. at 217.
"" The distinction drawn in Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co.,
394 U.S. 369 (1969), would seem no longer applicable: "Mil referring to decisions
holding state law preempted by the NLRA, care must. be taken to distinguish preemp-
tion based on federal protection of the conduct in question, ... from that based pre-
dominantly on the primary jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board . ..."
Id, at 383 n.19 (citations omitted).
1 " See notes 38-39 supra.
" 2 See Linn v. Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 61 (1966).
11 " Sears, 436 U.S. at 223 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
114
 424 U.S. 507 (1976). Hudgens concerned employees of a shoe manufacturer
who were picketing at a retail outlet of the manufacturer located in a privately owned
shopping !nail.
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tected under section 7." 5 The Hudgens Court held that "the primary respon-
sibility for making this accommodation [between employees' section 7 rights
and employers' private property rights] must rest with the Board in the first
instance." f 6 In Sears, however, the Court shifted the primary responsibility
for accommodating employees' section 7 rights and employers' private prop-
erty rights to state courts. In deciding whether to enjoin trespassory picketing,
a state court now must determine whether picketing is protected by section
7." 7 Thus, although the Court in Sears never mentions Hudgens, it overrules
the case by eliminating the Board's primary jurisdiction to protect employees'
section 7 rights in trespassory picketing situations ' 16 and by simultaneously
allowing state courts to exercise jurisdiction over arguably protected con-
duct.'"
The Court accomplishes this shift by replacing the primary jurisdiction
approach with an approach based on two balancing tests.' 2 " Under the pri-
mary jurisdiction approach a simple finding by a state court that the activity in
dispute was arguably protected or arguably prohibited by federal labor law
triggered NLRB preemption of state court jurisdiction.' 2 ' The Court in Sears
makes the determination of whether a state court has jurisdiction more com-
plex. If the state court finds that the conduct is arguably prohibited by section
8, the court must determine if the state interest in regulating the conduct at
issue outweighs the risk of interference with the regulatory jurisdiction of the
Labor Board.' 22 Where the state court finds that the disputed conduct is
arguably protected, the court must determine if the employer has a "reason-
able opportunity" 123 to bring the issue before the Board. If the employer
does not have such an opportunity, the state court must determine whether
the anomaly of denying the employer a forum outweighs the risk of state
court misinterpretation of federal law.' 24
The repercussions of the new balancing approach not only affect the im-
mediate issue of state jurisdiction over trespassory picketing, but also indicate
a shift in the theoretical basis of federal labor law preemption. The primary
jurisdiction approach was grounded in the theory that peace and stability in
labor-management relations are best achieved by a centralized, expert, federal
agency applying national labor laws.' 25 Jurisdiction over nearly all labor dis-
"s Id. at 522.
t
i" 436 U.S. at 201. See note 83 supra. The dissent argued that state courts are
incapable of properly making this determination. Sec text at note 104 supra.
" 8 Hudgens may still be good law on its facts. Trespassory picketing by man-
ufacturing employees of a shoe company, at a retail outlet of the company located in a
large shopping center, is protected by § 7. However, this determination was made by
the Board, on remand from the Supreme Court, Scott Hudgens, 230 N.L.R.B. 414, 95
L.R.R.M. 1351 (1977), and need not be followed by slate courts.
119 Sears, 436 U.S. at 207.
12,1 See text at notes 63 & 75 supra.
"I See text at note 37 supra.
122 Sears, 436 U.S. at 197.
123 Id. at 201-02.
124 Id. at 206.
125 Gannon, 359 U.S. at 242 (1959).
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putes, therefore, was preempted by the NLRB.' 2f3 By shifting jurisdiction
from the Board to state courts, Sears heralds a movement away from this
theory that broad, NLRB preemption is a requirement for stability in labor
relations.' 2 7
V. IMPACT OF SEARS
A recent Massachusetts case, Commonwealth v. Noffke,'" illustrates the im-
pact of Sears on a state court's consideration of NLRB preemption. Steven
Noffke, a union organizer, was arrested while he was soliciting employee sup-
port prior to a representation election ordered by the Board.' 29 Noffke was
tried and convicted of criminal trespass.'" The Massachusetts Supreme Ju-
dicial Court held that under Sears, the NLRB did not preempt state court
jurisdiction over Noffke's conduct."'
The Noffke case is a significant expansion of Sears because the remedy in
Noffke, unlike that in Sears, was not injunctive relief but a criminal sanc-
tion."' Through its interpretation of Sears, the Massachusetts Supreme Judi-
cial Court has expanded state jurisdiction into the central concerns of the
NLRA,' 33 and has allowed state courts to impose far greater penalties than
the NLRB is authorized to administer. Thus, Noffke provides employers with a
new and potent weapon against union organizers.
The impact of Sears on labor disputes involving issues other than trespas-
sory picketing is unclear. The Court may reevaluate other areas of NLRB
preemption through the use of its new balancing approach and further ex-
1211 See generally Cox, supra note 13.
127 The Court is led to this shift in jurisdiction by a conception that state courts
arc better able than the Board to protect significant employer interests and will not
substantially misinterpret federal labor law. See Sears, 436 U.S. at 205-07.
" 11 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2225, 379 N.E.2d 1086 (1978).
"" Id. at 2226, 379 N.E.2d at 1087.
ingi
" 1 Id. at 2233, 379 N.E.2c1 at 1090.
132 The Court in Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953), a case where
state court jurisdiction over union pickets was preempted by the NLRB, specifically
noted the inherent difficulty of two forums with disparate remedies considering the
same issue.
Pit does not follow that state and federal authorities may supplement each
other in cases of this type. The conflict lies in remedies, not rights. The
same picketing may injure both public and private rights. But when two
separate remedies arc brought to bear on the same activity, a conflict is
imminent.
Id. at 498-99.
"3 In Sears, the San Diego County District Council of Carpenters argued that
the union activity was arguably protected as area standards picketing. 436 U.S. at 206
n.42. By contrast, Steven Noffke was engaged in union solicitation in connection with a
Board ordered election. As the Sears Court noted, "the right to organize is at the very
core of the purpose for which the NI,RA was enacted. - Id. Perhaps restrictions on
organizational solicitation should be scrutinized more carefully than restrictions on
area standards picketing.
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panel state jurisdiction over labor disputes.'" Alternatively, the Court may
limit application of the balancing approach of Sears to disputes involving tres-
passory picketing, thus maintaining NLRB preemption over other labor dis-
putes. The issue of labor law preemption, unfortunately, is heading into
another period of "elucidating litigation."
Not only is the substantive reach of NLRB labor law preemption unclear
after Sears, but the procedural impact of the Sears decision is also largely un-
known. Among the questions raised by Sears is whether a state court can issue
an injunction if the union files a section 8(a)(1) charge with the NLRB after
being requested to leave the employer's property, and continues picketing
during a Board investigation.' 35 Sears also leaves unanswered the question
whether a state court can enjoin picketing if the union files a section 8(a)(1)
charge with the NLRB after the employer files its complaint in court.'"
Justice Blackmun, concurring in the decision of the Court,'" argued that
the answer to both these questions is no. For Justice Blackmun, the key to the
majority's analysis is that the employer could not bring the trespass issue be-
fore the Board. Thus, where the union presents the trespass issue to the
Board, the rationale for state court jurisdiction disappears; the Board, the
forum best suited to resolve the conflicting interests, should resolve the clis-
pute.' 38 Justice Powell, also concurring in the decision of the Court,'" dis-
agreed with justice Blackmun's assertion that state court jurisdiction is
preempted when the union files a charge with the Board. Justice Powell as-
134 One probable effect. of the Sears decision is that only trespassory picketing
which is actually, not merely arguably, protected by federal law will be protected in
state court. This may indicate that the Court is moving toward the position articulated
by Justice White in his concurring opinion in Longshoremen's Local 1416 v. Ariachie
Shipping Co., 397 U.S. 195, 201 (1970), that state court jurisdiction is preempted only
where the conduct in question is actually protected. Id. at 202. Cf. Sears, 436 U.S. at
200 ("several considerations persuade us that the mere fact that the union's trespass
was arguably protected is insufficient. to deprive the state court of jurisdiction in this
case." (emphasis in the original)).
135 See note 88 supra.
136 The questions arise because, as the dissent noted, the majority avoided hold-
ing that resort to the Board ousts state court jurisdiction. 436 U.S. at 233 n.14.
137 436 U.S. at 208 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
138 Justice Blackmun argued that:
[Title logical corollary of the Court's reasoning is that if the union does
file a charge upon being asked by the employer to leave the employer's
property and continues to process the charge expeditiously, state court
jurisdiction is pre-empted until such time as the General Counsel declines
to issue a complaint or the Board, applying the standards of NLRB v. Bab-
cock & Wilcox Co.. rules against the union and holds the picketing to be
unprotected. Similarly, if a union timely files a § 8(a)(1) charge, a state
court would be hound to stay any pending injunctive or damage suit
brought by the employer until the Board has concluded, or the General
Counsel by refusal to issue a complaint has indicated, that the picketing is
not protected by 7.
Id. at 209 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
130 Id. at 212.
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serted that the Sears decision shifts the balance of federalism in this area; it
does not merely reduce procedural difficulties for employers, as Justice
Blackmun suggested.'"
A realistic commentary on this dispute between concurring opinions is
provided by the dissent. Whatever the ultimate result of the dispute, said the
dissent, "state and federal courts around the country will answer these ques-
tions in a variety of ways." 14t Thus, the procedural aspects of labor law
preemption are as unsettled as the substantive accommodation between state
and federal interests.
CONCLUSION
In Sears, the Court held that state courts have jurisdiction to enjoin tres-
passory union picketing where the pickets have been requested to leave, and
the property owner does not have a reasonable opportunity to bring the dis-
pute before the NLRB. Sears creates the first instance of state court jurisdic-
tion over activity which is arguably protected by section 7 of the NLRA. This
broadening of state court jurisdiction over labor disputes is achieved by effec-
tively replacing the primary jurisdiction approach, developed in Garman, with
two balancing tests. After nearly twenty years of relative stability based on
almost total federal preemption of state jurisdiction over labor disputes, the
pendulum is swinging back toward increased state jurisdiction. Farmer hinted
that change was imminent; Sears speeds the pendulum on its way.
MICHAEL B. ROFFMAN
"cr Justice Powell was succinct in his disagreement: "In sum, I do not agree with
!kir. Justice Blackmun that the logical corollary of the Court's reasoning' in its opinion
today is that state court jurisdiction is preempted forthwith upon the filing of a charge
by the union." Id. at 214 (Powell, J., concurring).
"' Id, at 233 11.14 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent predicts that a con-
sequence of these unanswered questions "will he that erroneous determinations of
nonpre-emption will occur and rights and interests protected by the Act will be ir-
reparably damaged before any corrective action can he taken by this court." Id.
